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Abstract
We analyze the determinants of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with
noise in the contest success function. Sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies
is easier the more noise there is, and is more difficult the larger is the contest’s prize
value. An increase in the contest’s number of players can make sustaining collusion
either more or less difficult.
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1 Introduction
In a contest, players compete by making irrecoverable expenditures or costly efforts to in-
crease their probability of winning a prize. Lobbying, electoral competition, litigation, ad-
vertising competition, R&D competition, military conflict, and sporting competition are all
examples of real-world contests. In many such contests, players’ winning probabilities are
determined not only by their expenditures, but also by pure chance or noise. For example,
a military conflict could be decided not only by the sizes of the countries’ armies, but also
by the geography and prevailing weather where the conflict takes place. Many real-world
contests are also repeated. Repeated contests could provide players opportunities and in-
centives to collude by mutually refraining from competing with one another. If players are
sufficiently patient (or, equivalently, believe the contest will repeat with a sufficiently high
probability), then long-term collusion could dominate short-term opportunism when players
use strategies with implicit threats to punish deviations from collusion. Continuing with the
military conflict example, the long-lived nature of interactions among countries could pro-
vide them incentives to alter their military expenditures or reach other agreements that have
them refrain from engaging in costly conflicts. Because there are many real-world repeated
contests with noise, gaining insight into how noise affects incentives for collusion in repeated
contests is important.
We analyze incentives for tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with the
contest success function (CSF) introduced by Amegashie (2006b) where players’ winning
probabilities are affected by their expenditures as well as by a noise parameter.1 If players
are sufficiently patient, they can sustain maximal collusion (i.e., mutual refraining from
competing in the contest) by using Nash reversion strategies. We show that an increase
in the contest’s degree of noise makes sustaining collusion easier, while an increase in the
contest’s prize value makes sustaining collusion more difficult. An increase in the contest’s
number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less difficult.
This paper contributes to a literature on collusion in repeated contests. The main
message of this literature is that the long-lived nature of repeated contests can provide play-
ers with incentives to collude, which typically leads to lowered contest expenditures. Yang
(1993) and Leininger and Yang (1994) analyze contests in which players take turns choos-
1Dasgupta and Nti (1998) use a somewhat similar CSF specification in their study of optimal contest
design, but interpret their parameterization as the probability that the contest does not award the prize,
which is more like the contests with the possibility of a draw studied by Blavatskyy (2010) and Jia (2012).
Existing studies of contests with noise in the CSF are either one-shot (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2013;
Wasser, 2013; Grossmann, 2014) or are repeated but do not analyze players’ incentives for collusion (Eggert,
Itaya, & Mino, 2011).
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ing whether to increase or leave unchanged their current expenditures, which accumulate
over the contest’s horizon; when these alternating moves occur over an infinite horizon, a
tit-for-tat-like strategy can enable players to keep their equilibrium expenditures low and
possibly even minimal. Linster (1994) analyzes cooperative arrangements determined by the
Nash bargaining solution when players’ disagreement payoffs arise from reversion to Nash
equilibrium play in an infinitely repeated contest. Amegashie (2006a) shows that increased
prize value asymmetry between players makes sustaining collusion easier in an infinitely
repeated contest. In an infinitely repeated game of investment with imperfect property
rights, Amegashie (2011) shows that an equilibrium with overinvestment exists where the
asset owner and the potential appropriator cooperate by not competing for the asset in a
subsequent contest as long as the asset owner makes a transfer increasing in investment.
Cheikbossian (2012) studies infinitely repeated contests between two groups of unequal size
and shows that collusion (in the sense of a group overcoming its free-rider problem and in-
creasing its expenditures) can be as easy to sustain in the larger group as it is in the smaller
group.2
Our results on the factors affecting the sustainability of collusion differ markedly from
the closely related analysis of Shaffer and Shogren (2008), who analyze incentives for collu-
sion in an infinitely repeated contest with the Tullock (1980) CSF.3 The exponent to which
each player’s expenditure is raised in the Tullock CSF is the closest analogue to the noise
parameter in the CSF we study. When players attempt to sustain collusion by using Nash
reversion strategies, Shaffer and Shogren (2008) show that a decrease in this exponent (i.e.,
an increase in the level of noise in the contest) makes sustaining collusion more difficult by
making the Nash reversion punishment less severe.4 Shaffer and Shogren (2008) also show
2There also exist a number of studies that analyze explicit collusion in one-shot contests (Alexeev &
Leitzel, 1991, 1996; Huck, Konrad, & Mu¨ller, 2002) and that develop models of infinitely repeated contests
to analyze non-collusive behavior (Itaya & Sano, 2003; Mehlum & Moene, 2006; Kra¨hmer, 2007; Eggert
et al., 2011; Grossmann, Lang, & Dietl, 2011).
3The Tullock CSF takes the form
pit(x1t, ..., xnt) :=
{
xγit
xγit+
∑
j 6=i x
γ
jt
if xγit +
∑
j 6=i x
γ
jt 6= 0
1
n otherwise.
The exponent γ > 0 measures the CSF’s sensitivity to expenditures in determining winning probabilities and
is commonly referred to in contest theory literature as the CSF’s discriminatory power following Hillman
and Riley (1989). For low levels of γ (i.e., high levels of noise), winning probabilities do not vary much
among players with small expenditure differences; in the limit as γ → 0, the CSF is completely insensitive
to expenditures and each player has a uniform 1/n probability of winning no matter their expenditures.
For high levels of γ (i.e., low levels of noise), winning probabilities vary widely among players with small
expenditure differences; in the limit as γ → ∞, the CSF becomes the all-pay auction CSF in which the
player making the highest expenditures wins with probability 1.
4Shaffer and Shogren (2008) analyze the critical discount rate (r∗) sustaining collusion, which relates to
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that an increase in the contest’s prize value does not affect the sustainability of collusion and
that an increase in the contest’s number of players makes sustaining collusion more difficult.
Broadly speaking, our results differ from one another because of the nature of players’ devi-
ations from collusion. In Shaffer and Shogren (2008), each player’s optimal deviation from
collusion involves making an infinitesimally small expenditure and winning the contest with
probability 1 because the Tullock CSF lacks noise in this case. By contrast, the CSF in our
model always has noise, thus each player’s optimal deviation from collusion is more complex
because making positive expenditures when all other players make 0 expenditures does not
guarantee that a player wins the contest with probability 1.
2 Model
Each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... a finite set of players I = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2 compete in a simultaneous-
move contest to win a prize of value v > 0 to each player. Each player i ∈ I makes irrecov-
erable expenditures xit ≥ 0 to increase its winning probability pit, given by the CSF with
noise parameter α from Amegashie (2006b):
pit(x1t, ..., xnt) :=
xit + α
xit + α +
∑
j 6=i(xjt + α)
. (1)
Rai and Sarin (2009) provide an axiomatic foundation and Jia (2012) provides a stochastic
foundation for CSFs of the form in (1). Increasing the degree of noise in the contest has the
effect of discouraging expenditures. Thus, we assume that α ∈ [0, α) where α := (n−1)v/n2
so that the stage game’s unique Nash equilibrium is interior; if instead α ≥ α, the stage
game’s unique Nash equilibrium has each player making an expenditure of 0 and there exists
no form of collusion yielding players a Pareto improvement thus making the analysis of
incentives for collusion moot.
When players make expenditures (x1t, ..., xnt) in period t, the expected profits of player
i ∈ I in period t are:
piit(x1t, ..., xnt) := pit(x1t, ..., xnt)v − xit
=
xit + α
xit + α +
∑
j 6=i(xjt + α)
v − xit. (2)
Each player discounts future profits to their present value with the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
the critical discount factor (δ∗) we analyze as δ∗ = 1/(1 + r∗).
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3 Incentives for Collusion
In the absence of collusion, we suppose that players make expenditures according to the stage
game’s Nash equilibrium. As Amegashie (2006b) shows, when α < (n−1)v/n2 the stage game
has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each player makes expenditures xN = (n−1)v/n2−α
and earns expected profits piN = v/n
2 + α each period.5
When α < (n − 1)v/n2, players can improve upon the stage game’s Nash equilibrium
by collusion where each player makes an expenditure of xC = 0 and earns expected profits
piC = v/n each period. We suppose that players use the following Nash reversion strategies
of Friedman (1971) to sustain collusion tacitly as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
infinitely repeated contest.6 Nash reversion strategies prescribe that each player i ∈ I
• makes an expenditure of xC = 0 in period t = 0;
• makes an expenditure of xC = 0 in periods t = 1, 2, ... as long as all players have
made expenditures of xC = 0 in all periods to date; otherwise, the player makes an
expenditure of xN = (n− 1)v/n2 − α forever.
As an alternative to Nash reversion strategies, we could analyze the collusive behavior sus-
tained by the optimal punishment approach of Abreu (1986, 1988). Adopting such an ap-
proach would be preferable if Nash reversion strategies did not sustain maximal collusion
because optimal punishments can support a wider range of collusive behavior in equilibrium.
However, as we show below, since Nash reversion strategies do sustain maximal collusion,
we opt to follow the Friedman (1971) approach.
The optimal deviation xD of a player i ∈ I from the collusive arrangement above solves
max
xit
piit(xit, 0, ..., 0) =
xit + α
xit + nα
v − xit. (3)
The first-order condition of (3) is
(n− 1)α
(xit + nα)2
v − 1 = 0, 7
5It is straightforward to show that the first derivative of (2) with respect to xit is positive when xjt = 0
for all j ∈ I \ {i} and α < (n− 1)v/n2, ruling out all players making 0 expenditures as a Nash equilibrium.
It is also straightforward to show that (2) is strictly concave in xit.
6Numerous studies of collusion in repeated contests follow a similar approach; see, for example, Linster
(1994), Amegashie (2006a, 2011), Shaffer and Shogren (2008), and Cheikbossian (2012). Therefore, we adopt
this approach so that our results on incentives for collusion are comparable to ones already existing in the
literature.
7It is straightforward to show that (3) is strictly concave in xit.
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which is satisfied by x˜D = ±
√
(n− 1)αv − nα, of which only x˜D =
√
(n− 1)αv − nα > 0
when α < (n − 1)v/n2. Therefore, the optimal deviation is xD =
√
(n− 1)αv − nα and
earns expected profits of piD = v − 2
√
(n− 1)αv + nα in the period of deviation.
Nash reversion strategies sustain collusion as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the infinitely repeated contest if and only if the discounted profits from collusion exceed the
discounted profits from deviation and reversion to the stage game’s Nash equilibrium forever;
that is, Nash reversion strategies sustain collusion if and only if
piC
1− δ ≥ piD +
δ
1− δpiN ,
or
δ ≥ piD − piC
piD − piN
=
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− v
n
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
) := δ∗. (4)
Note that δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) because piD > piC holds if and only if [(n − 1)v/n − nα]2 > 0, which
always holds, and piC > piN holds if and only if α < (n− 1)v/n2, which holds by assumption.
Any factor increasing δ∗ makes collusion more difficult to sustain and any factor decreasing
δ∗ makes collusion easier to sustain. The following proposition describes how δ∗ varies with
α, v, and n.
Proposition. When players attempt to sustain maximal collusion by using Nash reversion
strategies in an infinitely repeated contest with the contest success function in (1), (i) an
increase in the contest’s degree of noise makes sustaining collusion easier, (ii) an increase
in the contest’s prize value makes sustaining collusion more difficult, and (iii) an increase in
the contest’s number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less difficult.
Proof. (i) Differentiating (4) with respect to α, we have
∂δ∗
∂α
= −
√
(n− 1)αv
{
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]}
α
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2 < 0,
which holds if and only if
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]
> 0,
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which holds if and only if [
(n− 1)v − n2α]2 > 0,
which always holds.
(ii) Differentiating (4) with respect to v, we have
∂δ∗
∂v
=
√
(n− 1)αv
{
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]}
v
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2 > 0,
which holds if and only if
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]
> 0,
which always holds, as we have shown above in (i).
(iii) Differentiating (4) with respect to n, we have
∂δ∗
∂n
=
[
− αv√
(n−1)αv + α +
v
n2
] [
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2
−
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− v
n
] [
− αv√
(n−1)αv + α +
2v
n3
]
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2 ≷ 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the nonmonotonic relationship between n and δ∗ by graphing (4) for
α = 0.9, v = 100, and n ∈ [2, 100]. Figure 1 shows that an increase in n initially makes
collusion more difficult to sustain and eventually makes collusion easier to sustain.
The properties of δ∗ are fairly intuitive. An increase in α decreases piD, decreasing
incentives to deviate from collusion, while it increases piN , increasing deviation incentives
because of the less severe Nash reversion punishment; the former effect dominates, thus an
increase in α makes sustaining collusion easier. An increase in v has three effects on δ∗:
it increases piD and piN , both of which increase incentives to deviate from collusion, and
it increases piC , increasing incentives for collusion; the first two effects dominate, thus an
increase in v makes sustaining collusion more difficult. An increase in n also has three effects
on δ∗: it decreases piD and piN , both of which decrease incentives to deviate from collusion,
and it decreases piC , decreasing incentives for collusion; which of the three effects dominate
depends upon the levels of α, v, and n, thus an increase in n can make sustaining collusion
7
Figure 1: Critical Discount Factor Sustaining Collusion (α = 0.9, v = 100, n ∈ [2, 100])
either more or less difficult.
4 Conclusion
Both expenditures and noise affect players’ performance in many real-world contests. Many
of these same contests are repeated, and therefore could offer players incentives to collude.
We analyze incentives for tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with noise where
players can sustain collusion by using Nash reversion strategies if players are sufficiently
patient. We show that an increase in the contest’s degree of noise makes sustaining collusion
easier, an increase in the contest’s prize value makes sustaining collusion more difficult, and
an increase in the contest’s number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or
less difficult.
The analysis in this paper suggests a number of avenues for future research. Empirical
research in the form of a carefully designed experiment could investigate the results in this
paper. Analysis of alternative mechanisms sustaining collusion in repeated contests with
noise or extending the analysis in this paper to the case of players asymmetrically affected
by noise could test the generalizability of our results.
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